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COMMENTARY: The Response of the
Judiciary
STATE COURTS AND FEDERALISM IN THE 1980's:
COMMENT
ROBERT J. SHERAN*
There is danger, it seems to me, that important basic traditions
and principles become obscured by complex and technical argu-
ment about the allocation of jurisdiction between state and federal
courts.
We can agree that a nation's court system functions effectively if
it resolves controversies expeditiously, economically, and fairly.
From the standpoint of the citizen, it is immaterial whether his
case is tried in a federal court or a state court. He has a problem
which can only be resolved by judicial decision. Whether that deci-
sion is made by a federal court judge or a state court judge is to
him a matter of no consequence. Except as advised by his attorney,
he does not know the one from the other. But there are historical
and institutional reasons which will separate the federal court sys-
tem and the state court system for our lifetime. It is important for
us to keep these historical and institutional circumstances in mind.
While the United States Constitution makes specific provision
for "one Supreme Court,"1 it leaves the establishment of "inferior
Courts" entirely to the discretion of Congress.2 It seems agreed
that the intent was that the courts of the states would be the prin-
cipal forums for dispute resolution in the country, with the federal
trial courts limited to problems involving interstate conflicts and to
cases in which the United States or one of its officers would be
* Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Minnesota. B.A., College of St. Thomas; LL.B., Uni-
versity of Minnesota.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
2. Id.; see, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943).
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involved as a party. The Judiciary Act of 17893 empowered the Su-
preme Court to review only those state court decisions which de-
nied a claimed federal right and restricted review to the federal
question alone;4 it was not until 1914 that the United States Su-
preme Court was empowered to review state court decisions to as-
sure uniformity of interpretation of federal law.5
It is interesting that the first substantial extension of the author-
ity of the federal judiciary came about as a consequence of nonuse
of power by the states following the Civil War. The Reconstruction
Congress, concerned by the failure of the states to protect the con-
stitutional rights assured by the fourteenth amendment, gave
plaintiffs with civil rights grievances against the states access to
the federal district courts. That is the origin of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,6
which creates liability for the deprivation under the color of state
law of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the federal Con-
stitution and laws.
It is important for those of us who are charged with the respon-
sibility for the operation of state court systems to keep in mind
that, while the increase of federal authority has been due in signifi-
cant measure to the economic growth and the increase in numbers
and mobility of our population, that increase has occurred most
frequently in the judicial branch of government when there has
been a failure or a refusal by state courts to fulfill the obligation
imposed by article VI of the United States Constitution to enforce
and respect federal law. The solution to that problem, if it is a
problem, is easy enough to discern.
The United States Supreme Court construed the authority given
by section 1983 with great restraint for almost one hundred years.
Access to federal courts by litigants claiming state action in denial
of federally protected rights was limited by judicial doctrines
which presumed that the states would correct the claimed infringe-
ment if given the unsupervised opportunity to do so.
It was the failure of state courts to deal effectively with govern-
mental intrusions upon the rights of the individual which led to
3. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
4. Id. § 26.
5. Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976))
(granting Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear cases by writ of certiorari).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (codifying Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13).
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the decisions of the United States Supreme Court during the War-
ren era making access to the federal courts for the protection of
individuals offended by unconstitutional state action easier to ob-
tain. Once again history teaches us a salient point: justice abhors a
vacuum, and when state courts fail to protect the constitutional
rights of individuals sympathetically and forcefully, federal courts
will fill the void so created.
Prior to 1963, the United States Supreme Court frequently ex-
pressed itself as being disturbed by procedures tolerated in state
courts with respect to such matters as the admission of confessions
challenged as not voluntarily given by persons charged with crime.
It was only after admonitions extending over a period of almost
twenty years that the series of decisions by the United States Su-
preme Court which established federal standards for the trial of
criminal cases were promulgated. And while there remain differ-
ences of opinion as to the wisdom of some of these decisions-the
Miranda case in particular-there seems to be substantial consen-
sus that the overall effect of the United States Supreme Court de-
cisions bearing on the trial of criminal cases in state courts has
been all to the good and probably long overdue. The significant
point is that it was the failure of state court systems to fulfill clear
obligations which resulted in the extension of federal judicial
authority.
The initial reaction of state judges to the 1960-1970 extensions
of the authority of the federal courts was hostile and defensive.
Many of the chief justices of the several states looked upon these
decisions of the United States Supreme Court as an affront to be
opposed as a matter of survival. By contrast, there is today sub-
stantial agreement among the state judges of this country with
whom I have regular contact that the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court affecting the trial of criminal cases in state
courts are sound in principle and should be adhered to in letter
and in spirit in the trial of all criminal cases. However, the view
that challenged state criminal convictions which have been ap-
proved by the final court of appeals of a state should not, in effect,
be reversed by a judge of the federal district court persists-most
emphatically.
The implicit assumption of what has been sald by some of the
panelists during this seminar is that state courts will not protect
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individual rights as effectively as will the federal courts. A vital
state court system cannot accept this criticism passively.
The challenge to the jurisdiction of state courts with respect to
criminal cases and with respect to civil rights cases together with
other factors have stimulated extraordinary efforts to improve
state court systems. Illustrative are these developments:
1. A national college for the judiciary has been established at
Reno, Nevada, and most state court judges have the opportunity of
attending courses there which emphasize current developments in
the law.
2. In most states, minimum qualifications for judges serving in
courts with significant responsibilities have been established and
commissions have been created whose function it is to eliminate
incompetence and venality.
3. Modern management methods have been introduced to expe-
dite the disposition of litigation, and training in this field is availa-
ble through the Institute for Court Management at Denver,
Colorado.
4. Technical assistance and support for- state court systems con-
cerned with the improvement of judicial service is provided
through the National Center for State Courts at Williamsburg,
Virginia and through its regional offices throughout the United
States.
5. The American Judicature Society and the American Bar Asso-
ciation have joined with civic groups in highly motivated efforts to
improve state judicial systems.
As a result, the quality of justice available in state court systems
has improved greatly throughout the United States during the past
twenty years, and there is every reason to believe that improve-
ment will continue. It is important that it should because over
ninety percent of the cases and controversies arising in this coun-
try are decided in state courts.
The improvement in the functioning of state court systems
throughout the country is important for an additional reason. Not-
withstanding recent increases in the number of federal judges in
this country, the appeals to the federal courts for relief are increas-
ing at a rate even greater than that experienced by most states.
This has resulted in backlogs in federal courts throughout the
United States which have caused grave concern to leaders of gov-
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ernment at all levels. Typical is the recent statement of Chief Jus-
tice Burger made during the course of an address to the American
Law Institute at Washington, D.C., to the effect that a reexamina-
tion and a reallocation of jurisdiction presently exercised by the
federal judicial system is a top priority for the 1980's.7 This same
combination of factors, that is the increasing strength of state
court systems and the inundation of federal courts, has moved the
Conference of Chief Justices of the United States to urge that the
diversity jurisdiction presently lodged in the federal courts should
be returned to the states.8 While there is a difference of opinion as
to advisability of this course, it is the opinion of the Conference of
Chief Justices that diversity jurisdiction should be yielded to the
states for these reasons:9
1. Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution pro-
vides that the judicial power of the United States extends to con-
troversies between citizens of different states, and since 1789 the
constitutional provision has been implemented by the provisions of
congressional enactment. But the demands on federal courts in the
eighteenth century were limited, and trial of diversity cases was
then considered more as an opportunity than a burden. This is no
longer true. Our federal courts are overwhelmed by the demands of
the criminal cases and the federal question cases which must be
given prior attention.
2. Diversity cases involve interpretations of state law. In our fed-
eral system, state courts are the final arbiters of state law. It is an
awkward situation for federal trial judges to be interpreting state
law and precedents when errors which are bound to occur cannot
be corrected by the highest court of the state, the laws of which are
being applied. This is particularly true where the law of torts is
involved, this being an area of the law characterized by constant
change and modification.
7. Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, 57th American Law Institute Annual
Meeting (June 10, 1980).
8. Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/Magistrates Reform: Hearings on H.R. 1046 &
H.R. 2202 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Jus-
tice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 109-14 (statement of Rob-
ert J. Sheran) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
9. The following reasons were presented to the House subcommittee studying reform of
federal diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 111-12.
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3. Diversity cases, for the most part, involve claims arising out of
contracts or suits for damages for personal injuries caused by de-
fective products or automobile accidents.10 These are the kinds of
litigation which state court judges handle regularly and routinely.
Federal court judges, whose major responsibilities are in other ar-
eas, have neither a special interest nor expertise in cases of this
kind.
4. Diversity jurisdiction attaches only if the amount in contro-
versy exceeds $10,000.11 Often the amount in controversy ques-
tion-wholly irrelevant to the merits of the case-is challenged,
and valuable judicial time is wasted in a contest over this collateral
issue. Apart from this, there is no reason in principle why the
$10,000 judicial limit-or any other larger amount-should distin-
guish cases triable in federal court from those which are not.1 2 The
citizen's right to justice should not turn on the dollar value of his
claim. The suggestion that "federal" is "better" and that the "big"
claim deserves the "better" treatment is inconsistent with accepted
notions of fair play in a democratic society.
5. Diversity jurisdiction attaches only if diversity of citizenship
as between the parties is entire.18 For example, if a resident of
Minnesota sues Ford Motor Company, a Michigan corporation, be-
cause of a claimed defect in an automobile manufactured by it, the
Ford Motor Company can, if the case is venued in Minnesota, re-
move the lawsuit to federal court if the amount in controversy ex-
ceeds $10,000, unless it has a principal place of business in Minne-
sota. 4 The question of whether a place of business is a principal
10. Between October 1, 1979 and September 30, 1980, 40,650 diversity cases were filed in
federal district courts. Contract and tort claims accounted for 19,877 and 19,317 of these
cases, respectively. Of the tort claims, 7,020 involved automobile, airplane, or marine acci-
dents. AD. OFF. U.S. CouRTs, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTIcs DURING THE TWELVE-
MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1980, at 28 (1980).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
12. Congressional support for this belief appears to be growing. Witness the abolition of
the amount in controversy requirement for federal question jurisdiction. Federal Question
Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (amending 28
U.S.C. § 1331).
13. The requirement of complete diversity dates from Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 267 (1806) (Marshall, C.J.). For a full discussion of this doctrine and its history, see
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouTs 94-96 (3d ed. 1976).
14. See, e.g., Canton v. Angelina Cas. Co., 279 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1960). See generally C.
WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 102-03.
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place of business as well as the question of whether a true diversity
of citizenship exists can be placed in issue, and if it is, valuable
judicial time is wasted on a question having nothing to do with the
merits of the case. If it is established that the Ford Motor Com-
pany, a Michigan corporation, does not have a principal place of
business in Minnesota, the case is tried in federal court. But if the
plaintiff in such an action were to join a Minnesota dealer as a
defendant, the case could not be removed. The requisite complete
diversity of citizenship between the parties would not exist. How
can it be argued that the Ford Motor Company needs protection
from Minnesota courts in the one case but not the other?
6. In the great bulk of cases in which a nonresident is a party,
the case is tried in state courts and cannot be removed. The num-
bers of these cases in state courts have increased greatly because of
the enactment of long-arm statutes which permit effective service
on nonresidents. No one seriously contends that the nonresident
party suffers from local prejudice in these cases because of its non-
residence. If it suffers a disadvantage because of its being a corpo-
ration, this is due to factors which apply to every business entity
involved in litigation, resident or nonresident. There is no reason
to give a nonresident business entity an advantage not available to
the others. There is even less reason for allowing a resident plain-
tiff to sue a nonresident defendant in the federal court of plain-
tiff's home state.
7. In any event, removal to federal court does not change the
situation insofar as it is affected by claims of prejudice based on
nonresidence. The jurors in federal courts are residents of the same
state as are state court jurors. Federal court judges have the same
essential background as do state court judges. Many of them have
served as state court judges before moving to the federal branch.
The security of life tenure of federal judges is an irrelevant consid-
eration in the kinds of cases-contracts and torts-where diversity
jurisdiction is involved.
8. There are prejudices to be found in both state and federal
courts which impede the administration of justice-prejudice
based upon hostility toward corporations, upon excessive identifi-
cation with the underdog, and upon consideration of race and
sometimes ethnic or religious background. But prejudice based
upon the state of residence is so insignificant as to be unimportant.
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To the extent that prejudice of any kind exists in a court system, it
should be corrected. But to suggest that it can be cured even in
part by permitting removal of diversity cases is to compound the
problem by obscuring its cause.
9. The power to remove diversity cases from state to federal
court gives tactical advantage to the party seeking delay. This is so
because given the priorities to be accorded criminal cases under
the Speedy Trial Act1 5 and the pressing demands involved in many
federal question cases, the trial of diversity cases in many federal
courts is extremely difficult to achieve.
10. The implicit assumption of diversity jurisdiction, that a fair
trial cannot be secured in state court notwithstanding the fact that
the case involves state law exclusively, demeans state court sys-
tems at a time when national efforts to improve the state courts
should be recognized and encouraged. Assignment of jurisdiction of
all diversity cases to state courts will stimulate the movement to
strengthen and improve state judicial systems in every part of the
country so that the ultimate goal of justice uniformly and expedi-
tiously afforded will be available to every citizen of the United
States.
Whatever the final resolution of the diversity question may be,
the basic principle will persist: jurisdiction as between federal and
state courts should be allocated in such a way as to avoid unneces-
sary duplication of effort and to assign to each of the court systems
that type of litigation which, in terms of history and natural apti-
tude, each is best able to carry out. From my perspective, subsidi-
ary principles which should be applied in making this allocation
include these:
1. If state courts are able to deal with legal problems as well as
or almost as well as the federal courts, jurisdiction should be as-
signed to state courts not only because this is consistent with our
national history but also because it is a policy which conforms with
the rule that governmental authority, whenever possible, should be
exercised by that level of government most directly connected with
the citizenry affected by its performance.
15. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§
3152-3156, 3161-3174, 28 U.S.C.A. § 604 (West Supp. 1980)), as amended by Speedy Trial
Act Amendment Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-43, 93 Stat. 327.
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2. So far as possible, supervision of and correction of errors in
the functioning of state trial courts and state agencies should be
the exclusive responsibility of the highest appellate court of the
state involved. Federal trial courts should not be encouraged and
indeed, except in the most extraordinary of circumstances, should
not be permitted to intrude upon or overturn the deliberative
judgments of the highest appellate court of a state.
3. State courts should defer to and respect the unique capacity
of the federal courts to delineate the meaning of the United States
Constitution and the enactments of the United States Congress. If
the principle that federal courts will not override or "second guess"
state courts, except in the most egregious of circumstances and
then only after affording the state court systems an opportunity to
deal with the problem involved in their own way, is observed, the
judicial, the legislative, and the executive departments of state
government should accede to appropriate federal judicial directives
involving state action with grace and good will.
4. State courts should be prepared to recognize the superior ca-
pacity of the federal court system to adjudicate certain kinds of
complicated litigation when numerous parties based in different
parts of the country are involved, cases when the national fund of
expertise should be brought to bear on the issues, and cases when
the subject matter involved impacts significantly on the interests
of other states.
5. Every state should regularly review its procedures relating to
criminal cases to be sure that affirmative and aggressive action is
taken to assure respect for federally protected rights of the indi-
vidual as defined by the appropriate courts in the judicial branch
of the federal government. In states where this is being done, fed-
eral intervention should be kept at a minimum. It is my personal
belief that our experience in Minnesota is illustrative of the way in
which this potentially disruptive problem can be handled effec-
tively and in the public interest.
The net result of the application of these principles will be to
limit federal jurisdiction to those cases where the peculiar charac-
teristics of the federal judiciary give it a special capacity to resolve
contention. The great bulk of the cases will continue to be handled
in state courts as they should be, and if state court systems im-
prove, some of the jurisdiction presently exercised by federal
1981]
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courts can and I think will be assigned to the courts of the states.
By the terms of its preamble, the Constitution of the United
States of America was ordained in order to establish justice. The
obligation of fulfilling this commitment is a continuing one, de-
manding a joint effort to achieve these objectives: 6
1. To make the courts of our nation, state and federal, accessible
to everyone. This means that adequate court rooms at convenient
places must be available, that well-qualified judges be selected and
retained to supervise the judicial process, and that adequate legal
services be provided to assist with the average person's problems
at a cost which the average person can afford.
2. To divert from the courts of the country disputes and contro-
versies which can be settled more expeditiously and effectively by
other means and in other places. This objective recognizes that
there are circumstances where methods such as arbitration, concili-
ation, and mediation work better than the formal processes of the
courts. The process of identifying these cases is difficult and
important.
3. To be certain that the judicial systems of the nation function
efficiently. This objective calls for emphasis on the importance of
improved methods of judicial administration, the employment of
modern management methods, and the training of court-related
personnel so that the work of the courts will be conducted as effi-
ciently and effectively as possible.
4. To reduce the costs of dispute resolution. This objective rec-
ognizes that justice is frequently unattainable by many people be-
cause of the expense involved in obtaining access to the courts.
Justice which cannot be afforded is justice denied.
5. To extend educational programs so that those who administer
justice are kept fully and currently informed and those who seek
justice are made aware of the availability of help through the na-
tion's court systems. This objective implies that the law to be ap-
plied in the resolution of disputes is constantly changing as the
needs of society change and that all people concerned with justice
must be continuously educated to keep abreast with the times.
6. To divide the responsibility for providing access to the court
16. I conveyed these objectives to the Congress on behalf of the Conference of Chief Jus-
tices of the United States. Hearings, supra note 8, at 113.
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systems of the nation between the state and federal court systems
in such a way as (a) to employ the total capacity of both systems
as effectively as possible, (b) to avoid duplication and repetition of
effort, (c) to keep the process of dispute resolution, both civil and
criminal, as close to the people affected as possible, and (d) to pre-
serve the independence and integrity of state courts. This implies
that the general jurisdictional responsibilities of the court systems
should be placed primarily in the courts of the states, that the fed-
eral court system should continue to be one of limited and special-
ized jurisdiction, and that the efforts of both the state and federal
court systems should be coordinated and integrated in such a way
as to make the system as a whole work as effectively as possible.
The significant principle of federalism is that governmental au-
thority should be exercised so far as possible by that unit of gov-
ernment closest to the people affected by its exercise. This princi-
ple acknowledges that in a country like the United States, with a
population that moves about freely, and with people who share so
many ideals, traditions, and common modes of thought, there must
be national standards to which all of the people adhere. But the
process by which the judiciary absorbs these standards should be
one which so far as possible is managed through courts which are
linked as closely to the people affected by their operation as
possible.
In the years ahead, it seems to me, we can expect that through-
out the country the rules of law that will be applied, whether in
federal or in state courts, will increasingly become more uniform
because as communication increases-radio, television, the printed
news media-people's thinking and attitudes become more uni-
form. And uniformity also comes about because the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, which are the final authority in
construing the Federal Constitution and federal laws, become ac-
cepted and implemented by state courts. State legislatures adopt
uniform laws dealing with matters that have multistate impact:
child custody, marriage dissolution, and things of that kind.
While standards become uniform, the implementation of those
standards through the court system, so far as possible and feasible,
should be primarily through state courts. If the distinction be-
tween federal courts and state courts is altogether dissolved, ne-
glected, or overlooked, we may arrive at a situation where there is
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such a separation between the people who are affected by the oper-
ation of the courts on the one hand, and the courts themselves on
the other, that the kind of voluntary acceptance of authority which
is the key to the operation of a judicial system will be endangered.
Having presented this outline of my views with respect to the
allocation of jurisdiction as between state and federal courts, I di-
rect my attention to the scholarly statements made by Professors
Paul M. Bator, Robert M. Cover, Martha A. Field, and Burt
Neuborne.
I find myself in general agreement with most of the positions
taken by them in support of the significant role which federal
courts must play in the administration of justice in this country
during the years ahead, but with these qualifications:
1. Federal courts should not undertake jurisdiction of cases
which involve primarily the interpretation of state law.
2. The process by which a single federal district court judge be-
comes, in effect, a court of review of final decisions made by the
highest appellate court of the state should be changed.
3. The national interest in improving the administration of jus-
tice in state court systems as possible forums for the protection of
rights secured by the Federal Constitution and federal laws should
be acknowledged, particularly in light of the fact that the Congress
can and someday may limit the jurisdiction of federal district
courts in dealing with matters of this kind.
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